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Abstract 
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese manufacturing enterprises during 1999-2005, 
which accounts for over 90% of China’s industrial output, and robust econometric 
procedures we show that the Chinese banking system has helped to support the growth 
of both firm value added and TFP.  We find that access to bank loans is positively 
correlated with future value added and TFP growth.  We also find that firms with access 
to bank loans tend to grow faster in regions with greater banking sector development.  
While the effects of bank loans on firm growth are more pronounced in the case of 
purely private-owned and foreign firms, they are positive and statistically significant 
even in the case of state-owned and collectively-owned firms.  We show that excluding 
loss-making firms from the sample does not change the qualitative nature of our results.  
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1. Introduction 
China offers a most interesting and possibly unique setting in which to examine the 
relationship between finance and growth, utilising firm-level data, for (at least) three 
compelling reasons, which are as follows:  
(i) China is one of the most important and fastest-growing economies in the world.  
Almost 30 years of rapid economic growth – in itself an unprecedented 
phenomenon - has transformed China from an agricultural economy to the 
factory of the world; from a closed economy into the world’s largest exporter of 
textiles, toys, laptop computers, cell phones, digital cameras, etc. and the 2nd 
largest FDI recipient country.  As a result, China now has the largest volume of 
foreign reserves in the world, as well as one of the largest banks (the ICBC).  
Therefore, examining the role played by the finance-growth mechanism within 
China is interesting in its own right and could therefore make a useful 
contribution to the finance-growth literature. 
(ii) The Chinese banking system has been dominated by state-owned banks and is 
widely regarded of very poor quality by international standards (e.g. Allen et al, 
2005).  The mainstream view in the literature is that government-owned banks 
are inefficient and motivated by political objectives.1 China’s banking sector has 
accumulated huge amounts of bad loans, not least because one of its major 
responsibilities has been the bailing out of financially distressed state owned 
enterprises.  Furthermore, it has been argued that the Chinese banking sector is 
regionally segmented, that financial resources are not mobile and that they are 
allocated inefficiently (Young, 2001; Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2005). Allen et al 
(2005) have, therefore, argued that because of its inefficient banking system, 
China represents an important counter example to the apparent consensus that a 
well-developed financial system is necessary for growth.2  Based on this view, 
one might therefore expect that the finance-growth mechanism would be weak, 
if present at all, in the case of China.   Allen et al (2005) in fact ascribe Chinese 
                                                 
1 See, however, Andrianova et al ( 2008) for a critique of this view.  
2 For recent surveys of the finance and growth literature see Demetriades and Andrianova (2005) and Levine 
(2003). 
economic growth to informal financial channels than the formal, state-
dominated, financial system.3  
(iii) Increased data availability over recent years means that finance-growth type 
questions can now be examined using very large micro data sets.  In this paper 
we utilise a very large micro panel data set that spans the entire Chinese 
manufacturing industry which contains detailed information on firms' sources 
of financing.  Our dataset includes 1.3 million observations that cover the period 
1999-2005; by 2005 a quarter million firms are included.  The firms in our sample 
account for nearly 90% of total industrial output in China.4   
This paper, therefore, utilises a very large micro dataset of Chinese firms to examine the 
contribution of bank finance to the growth of firm value added and total factor 
productivity, controlling for firm characteristics and ownership structure. The results of 
our investigation are therefore likely to have important policy implications, not only for 
China but also for other developing and transition economies in which state-owned banks 
and enterprises are prominent.  
Our main finding is that, contrary to what might be expected from a state-dominated, 
inefficient banking system, the finance-growth mechanism in China has been alive and 
kicking.   Specifically, we find that access to bank loans is positively correlated with future 
value added and TFP growth. Moreover, we find that firms with access to bank loans tend 
to grow faster in regions with greater banking sector development.  While the effects of 
bank loans on firm growth are more pronounced in the case of privately owned and 
foreign firms, they are positive and statistically significant even in the case of state-owned 
and collectively- owned firms.  Our findings - which challenge the Allen et al (2005) view 
on the role of the Chinese banking system - are nevertheless broadly consistent with the 
                                                 
3There is, however, a parallel literature which explains how China’s regional decentralization contributed to 
the success of Chinese economic reforms and thus to economic growth (e.g. Qian and Xu, 1993). Theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence have been provided that regional decentralization created incentive 
conditions for regional competition which fosters regional economic growth (Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000; Li 
and Zhou, 2006).  Moreover, it is argued that Chinese regional decentralization creates conditions for 
experimenting reform policies. This contributes substantially to the success of reforms and growth (Qian, 
Roland and Xu, 2006). 
 
4 For comparison purposes it should be noted that Allen et al (2005) use a dataset of 1100 listed firms during 
the period 1992-2000. 
findings of a recent macro-econometric study by Rousseau and Xiao (2007); these authors 
provide evidence using aggregate data and time-series econometric methods which 
suggests that banking sector development during 1995-2005 played a central role in 
China’s economic growth during that period.    
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the dataset and variable 
construction.  Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and the empirical model.  
Section 4 presents the empirical results while section 5 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Data and variable construction 
The main source of our data is the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics 
compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China (various issues), covering the 
population of Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises with annual turnover of more than 5 million RMB Yuan (about $620,000). The 
sample accounts for nearly 90% of total industrial output.5 The dataset, which we have 
collected for the period 1999-2005, contains detailed information on output, assets, sources 
of finance, exports, sales, value added, employment, wages, R&D expenditure, product 
innovation and employee training outlay, as well as ownership structure, industry 
affiliation, and geographical location.6  Other data sources include China Statistical 
Yearbook, China Fixed Asset Statistical Yearbook and China Financial Statistics.  
We provide detailed information on the dataset structure in Appendix 1 Tables A1-A3.  
Table A1 presents the frequency distribution of firms during the sample period, showing 
that the number of firms almost doubled during the sample period.  Tables A2 and A3 
show the industrial classification and geographical distribution of firms, respectively, 
confirming that the dataset exhibits reasonable sectoral and geographical balance.   
 
2.1 Classification of firm ownership type 
                                                 
5 This figure is calculated using China Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 
6 The data are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (2000-
2003). 
Officially, firm ownership type in China is classified according to the Regulation of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises. 
This classification has been questioned recently (e.g. Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei, 2007), 
given ownership changes among Chinese enterprises in various forms have happened 
during the reform years.  We therefore create our own, data driven, ownership 
classification utilising the rich information provided in the dataset, which includes the 
share of equity capital contributed by the state, collective investors, domestic private and 
foreign investors.  Specifically, we classify firms as state owned enterprises (SOE) if the 
share of state capital in total equity is 50% or higher; collectively owned enterprises (COE) 
if the share of collective capital in total equity is 50% or higher; foreign owned enterprises 
(FOR) if the share of foreign capital (incl. capital from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan 
and foreign countries) is 50% or higher; domestic private enterprises (Private): all 
remaining enterprises. The latter group is further classified into three sub-types:  
(i) Private with state capital (Private_state): if the share of state capital is greater 
than zero (but less than 50%); 
(ii) Private with foreign capital (Private_for): if the share of foreign capital is greater 
than zero (but less than 50%); 
(iii) Pure private (PPrivate): the rest of the firms (i.e. those without state or foreign 
capital). 
The dataset structure in terms of firm’s ownership is summarized in Appendix Table A4.  
Private firms represent 62% of the sample; of these, pure private firms constitute more 
than half the sample (54.2%).  There are only a relatively small number of private firms 
with state capital (1.6%) and a somewhat larger number of private firms with foreign 
capital (6.5%).  SOEs represent 11.7% of the sample during the entire period, but this 
average figure masks a declining trend reflecting privatisation of state owned firms.7 The 
remaining two categories are COEs, which account for 12.40% of the sample, and foreign 
invested firms, which represent 16.0% of the sample; the majority of foreign invested firms 
are owned by Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwanese investors. 
 
                                                 
7 The percentage of SOEs has dropped through time from 28% in 1999 to 6% in 2005.  
2.2 Variable construction and summary statistics 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the estimations for the 
overall sample and also by ownership type.  The total factor productivity (TFP) measure is 
estimated following the methodology of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which is outlined in 
Appendix 2. This approach has been widely applied in recent literature because of its 
advantage of being able to control for the simultaneity between firm’s choice of input 
levels and unobserved productivity shocks by using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as 
raw materials or electricity) as proxies. For all firms, the average TFP growth reaches 8.5% 
over the sample period, with a high standard deviation indicating large heterogeneity 
among firms8.  There is an on average 12.4% of industrial value added growth over the 
period 1999-2005, again with the highest growth among pure private domestic firms, 
followed by foreign firms. The high standard deviations suggest a substantial variation 
among firms.  The average firm age is approximately 10 years, with loss-makers being 
older on average, 14 years. The average firm size in the sample, measured as the logarithm 
of total employment, is 4.907 (equal to 297 employees). We measure firm’s access to formal 
finance by the logarithm of the amount of bank loans obtained by the end of each period. 
The average level of bank loans is 1.004 (equal to RMB Yuan 2,481,300, or approximately 
US$300,000). The average level of equity finance is 3.596 (equal to RMB Yuan 16,027,000, 
or approximately US$1,931,000). There are several indicators at 3-digit SIC industry level 
used in our analysis. Exit rate at industry is the percentage of firm exit in each year. On 
average the exit rate among Chinese firms is 17.6% over the period of 1999-2005. PRIVY, 
measured by regional aggregate bank loans issued to private sector over regional GDP, is 
to capture the degree of regional financial development. It is proved to be a reasonable 
measure by previous finance-growth literature (see Levine 2005).  
 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
In order to evaluate the extent to which the Chinese banking system promotes firm 
growth, we specify an empirical model in which access to formal finance can influence 
                                                 
8 Note that we have adopted the improved capital stock measurement suggested by Jefferson et al (2000), at the price of 
losing one year observations. As such, the calculated TFP is the average growth rate of the TFP over 2000-2005.  
firm performance over and above non-financial factors such as firm age, size, industry etc.   
Specifically, our model is as follows.     
ititY ittijititit DEQUITYFDBANKBANKX εβββββ +++++′= −−− 51,4013121 )*(          (1)    
The dependent variable Yit represents either total factor productivity or value added 
growth for firm i at time t.  BANK it-1 denotes the stock of bank loan liabilities of firm i 
outstanding at time t-1; EQUITYit-1 denotes the total amount of equity finance invested in 
firm i at time t-1.  Xit is a vector of control covariates, Dit is a vector of dummies, including 
various fixed effects, and εit is a random error term.  
Entering equity finance alongside bank loans in the empirical model helps to ensure 
robustness in that the estimated coefficient is more likely to capture the effect of bank 
loans, as opposed to the effect of another omitted formal finance channel, with which bank 
finance may be correlated.9 Moreover, it allows a comparison of the differential impact of 
bank and equity finance, which can provide additional insights into the finance-growth 
nexus within China.   
Both finance variables are lagged by one period to control for potential endogeneity. Bank 
loans or equity finance may be correlated with unobserved shocks to firm performance, 
hence using contemporaneous values may result in biased estimates.  By making the 
finance variables predetermined, one potential source of bias is therefore removed.  
However, even if the estimated coefficients turn out to be positive, it does not follow that 
the correlation between bank loans and firm performance can be interpreted causally i.e. 
getting a bank loan isn’t necessarily the reason why a firm grows faster.  Indeed, economic 
analysis suggests that even if banks are able to pick winners – i.e. firms with profitable 
opportunities – through effective screening of loans applicants, it does not mean that the 
bank loans they provide cause them to grow faster.  Bank loans simply enable firms to 
exploit profitable opportunities. Whether causal or not, a positive correlation between 
(lagged) bank loans and firm performance would suggest that Chinese banks are carrying 
out their screening function effectively.  Hence, if such a positive correlation is found, we 
could legitimately conclude that Chinese banks are at the very least supporting or 
facilitating the growth of firms.     
                                                 
9 The qualitative nature of the results is unaltered even if we exclude equity finance.   
We shed more light on the finance growth nexus in China, by interacting BANK with an 
indicator of initial financial development in the region in which a firm is based (FDj0, 
where j represents the region).  This allows us to examine whether regional financial 
development mediates the growth enhancing effects of access to bank finance.  The finance 
and growth literature suggests that the impact of banks on firm performance is likely to be 
larger in more financially developed countries (and consequently regions). This is because 
banks are more likely to have greater expertise in monitoring and screening loan 
applicants in more financially developed countries (or regions), hence they would channel 
loans into the more productive firms.  Consequently, if this term is found to be positive 
and significant, it would suggest that the standard finance and growth mechanism is 
operational within China.  We use the initial level of financial development to address 
possible reverse causality between regional financial development and firm performance.  
It is not impossible that some regions may become more financially developed because 
they have a large number of fast growing firms.  By using the initial level of the financial 
development indicator, which is interacted with lagged bank loans, we are avoiding any 
contemporaneous correlation between this composite variable and unobserved shocks to 
firm performance.  
Besides equity finance, the empirical model includes a vector of other control covariates, 
Xit, hypothesised to impact on firm growth.  These controls include linear and squared 
terms of (initial) firm size and age.  They also include the initial level of TFP or value 
added which is included to capture convergence; a negative coefficient would indicate 
that a part of firm growth in value added represents catch-up from a low initial value.  
Hence, we expect this term to be negative.  The vector Dit consists of a full set of firm 
ownership, industry and regional dummies, since it is important to control for the 
possibility that these fixed characteristics affect firm performance.  In addition it also 
includes time dummies, to remove the effects of temporal shocks that affect all firms, as 
well as time dummies interacted with region dummies to remove the possible influence of 
any regional fixed effects that vary with time, such as changing regional economic policies.   
Since the growth variable is only observed for firms that have survived, it is important to 
correct for selection bias due to firms’ survival.  A popular method for correcting 
selectivity bias is to apply the technique due to Heckman (1976).  However, this technique 
is not appropriate in panel data models like ours – see Equation (2).  Wooldridge (1995) 
shows that in such cases, Heckman’s method leads to inconsistent estimates and proposes 
more appropriate methods for testing and correcting for sample selection bias in these 
models.  We therefore utilise Wooldridge’s techniques to test for and correct the selectivity 
bias that may arise due to firms’ survival in our data set.  The variables we include in the 
selection equations are quadratic terms of size and age, productivity, industry 
concentration and industry entry and exit rate.  These are standard variables used in the 
firm survival literature (e.g. Dunne and Hughes, 1994 and Mata et al., 1995). 
The Wooldridge estimator starts by estimating for each time period t=1, 2, …T the 
selection equation by standard probit.  Next,  it obtains the inverse Mills ratio for 
surviving firms, say , and defines the  matrix of inverse Mills ratios, say itλˆ itΛ , as 
( )00ˆ00 itit λ=Λ
itititjitititit DFDBANKBANKXY
.  The selection bias corrected estimates can then be obtained by 
estimating the baseline model (Equation 1) augmented with the matrix of inverse Mils 
ratios (the correction terms).  That is 
.                   (2)       β β β + β++′= −− 4013121 )*( + γΛ +ε
A test for the joint significance of the correction terms provides a test for sample 
selectivity. 
To summarise, our empirical strategy is robust to a wide range of possible econometric 
issues that may arise when using panel data sets of the type we are using in this paper.  
Specifically, we have taken steps to address (i) possible bias due to sample selection 
relating to firm survival, (ii) potential endogeneity of regressors through the use of lagged 
finance and by controlling for various fixed effects, including any time varying regional 
factors, (iii) potential endogeneity problems related to the measurement of TFP via the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method (see Section 2.2.). 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
The main empirical results are presented in Tables 2-5.  Tables 2 and 3 contain the 
estimates of the determinants of TFP growth while Tables 4 and 5 contain the estimates of 
the determinants of value added growth.  Tables 3 and 5 include the interaction term 
between regional financial development and bank loans in the list of regressors while 
tables 2 and 4 do not.  
We first examine the results in Table 2.  To start with, the selection test in all columns 
validates the use of the Wooldridge estimation method. Column (1), which contains the 
overall results, shows that ownership matters for TFP growth, with all ownership types 
having higher TFP growth than the benchmark group, which corresponds to state-owned 
firms.  This is certainly a very plausible result, given that state owned firms are unlikely to 
be at the forefront of innovation.  What is a little surprising is that the highest group in 
terms of TFP growth are not foreign firms but pure private (domestic) firms, followed by 
collectively owned enterprises and private (domestic) firms with some foreign capital.   
The initial level of TFP enters with a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting 
convergence is taking place, albeit at a fairly slow speed – its coefficient is -0.14.  The other 
controls enter with plausible coefficients.  Access to bank loans enters with a positive, 
albeit small, coefficient that is highly significant, while equity finance enters with a 
substantially higher positive coefficient that is also highly significant.  Columns (2)-(7) in 
the same table contain the results for different ownership types.  Both bank loans and 
equity finance have positive and highly significant coefficients for all ownership types.  
Both finance variables have the highest coefficients in the case of foreign owned firms, 
followed by pure private (domestic) firms.  Bank loans have the smallest coefficients in the 
case of private firms with state capital followed by collectives and state owned firms.  
These results suggest that the finance-growth mechanism works better in the case of 
privately owned firms but it is not absent even in the case of state owned firms. 
The results in Table 3 are similar to those in Table 2, except for the coefficient of bank loans 
which is now much lower and is no longer significant for all ownership types.  However, 
the newly introduced interaction term is positive and highly significant throughout Table 
3.  Taken together, these results suggest that the Chinese banking system has a positive 
influence on TFP growth and that on the effects of bank loans are amplified by the state of 
regional financial development. Firms with identical characteristics, including the same 
access to bank loans, will grow faster if they are located in regions that are more 
financially developed.  Given that this effect is over and above any (time-varying) regional 
effects, we can conclude that it is not simply capturing changes in regional economic 
policies.  Conversely, the positive and significant coefficient of this interaction term also 
suggests that regional financial development has a bigger positive impact on TFP growth 
in those firms that borrow more from banks.   
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the same exercise as Tables 2 and 3 but with firm value added 
growth as the dependent variable instead of TFP growth.  Controlling for initial industrial 
value added level, the conclusions that can be drawn by examining the estimated 
coefficients are broadly very similar to those that can be drawn from Tables 2 and 3.   The 
interaction term now enters with substantially higher coefficients relative to the 
corresponding terms in Table 3, suggests that regional financial development has 
quantitatively larger effects on firm value-added growth than on TFP growth.   
The results in Tables 2-5 provide very clear evidence that even in the overall sample, 
which includes state-owned enterprises, the finance-growth mechanism in China is both 
alive and kicking.  Importantly, our evidence suggests that the growth-finance mechanism 
in China does not merely reflect the effects of financial development on capital 
accumulation – financial development seems to have a positive effect on TFP growth.   
 
Loss making enterprises and the finance-growth mechanism 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of re-estimating our main model after removing loss-
making firms from the sample.  Loss making enterprises represent 14% of firms in our 
sample, and 27% of state-owned firms.  It may be argued that bank lending to loss-making 
enterprises, particularly state-owned ones, is politically motivated, since state-owned 
banks, which dominate China’s banking system, may be required by the government to 
keep alive firms that serve political objectives.  If this were true, it would undermine 
banks’ ability to finance productive enterprises and we would therefore expect to see 
higher coefficients on the bank loan variable and its interaction with regional financial 
development if loss-making enterprises were removed from the sample.  On the other 
hand, if lending to loss making enterprises is dictated by economic criteria, particularly 
the future prospects of these firms, removing these firms from the sample should not alter 
the results very much.  This is because loss-making firms that receive bank loans would be 
the ones whose future prospects are bright, as it would not make any commercial sense for 
banks to make loans to loss-making firms who are unlikely to be able to repay the loans in 
the future.    
Tables 6 and 7 show that in the overall sample, the coefficient on bank loans is somewhat 
higher than the corresponding one in Tables 3 and 5, respectively.  This change is, 
however, non-negligible only in the industrial value added comparison where the 
coefficient on bank loans rises from 0.0026 to 0.0042, with the increase being slightly more 
than two standard errors. The coefficient of bank loans becomes significantly positive for 
pure private domestic firms in Table 7 in comparison to Table 5, suggesting profit-making 
firms benefit from bank loans; for SOE and private with state capital, the coefficients 
remain insignificant but are more positive; while profit-making foreign firms have higher 
significantly positive coefficients. The coefficients of the interaction term of bank loans and 
financial development show a minor. Thus, it appears that excluding loss-making firms 
from the sample increases the direct effect of bank loans on industrial value added growth 
but mitigates their effect through regional financial development.  Interestingly, this 
overall result does not reflect changes in the coefficient of bank loans for state owned 
enterprises, but the coefficients on collectives and private firms.  By removing loss making 
enterprises from the sample, this coefficient switches from insignificant to significant in 
the cases of collective enterprises and pure private (domestic) firms.  Once again the 
coefficient of the interaction term declines but remains significant in the case of all 
ownership types.    
We can, therefore, conclude that removing loss-making enterprises from the sample does 
not alter the qualitative nature of the results very much at all.   These findings seem to 
tentatively suggest that politically motivated lending to loss making firms in China is not 
as widespread as it is perhaps believed to be.   In order to explore this issue in more depth, 
we ran the TFP growth regressions on loss making firms alone.10   In the overall sample, 
the effect of both bank loans and the interaction term remains positive and significant, 
suggesting that the banking system continues to have a positive impact even on loss 
making firms.  However, the results by type of ownership show that this effect varies 
widely between private and state-owned enterprises.  The relevant coefficients are positive 
                                                 
10 These results are not reported in a separate table to save space.   
and significant at the 1 per cent level for pure private firms and foreign owned firms; they 
are positive and significant at the 5 per cent level for collectives.  When it comes to state-
owned enterprises, the effect of bank loans is significant only at the 10 per cent level while 
the interaction term is not significant.  Finally, when it comes to private firms with some 
state capital, both the relevant coefficients are insignificant.  These results seem to suggest 
that banks may be able to turn around loss-making firms as long as they are not wholly or 
partially government owned.   Thus, there appears to be some evidence to suggest that 
lending to loss-making enterprises in which the government has an ownership stake may 
indeed be politically driven.  Aside from these firms, however, our findings on all other 
types of firms suggest that the finance and growth mechanism in China is operating 
reasonably well, notwithstanding the close ties between banks and political authorities.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Our empirical results suggest that the view that China’s banking system has been an idle 
or even disruptive participant in the process of Chinese economic growth is not supported 
by the empirical evidence.  Our paper certainly adds to the growing body of evidence 
which suggests that in fact the Chinese banking system played a central role in supporting 
economic growth (see also Rousseau and Xiao, 2007).   We believe this is not only an 
interesting finding but also a comforting one.  It is clearly interesting to confirm that the 
finance-growth mechanism is present, even in a country with state dominated banks; this 
result casts further doubt on the critics of government ownership of banks (see also 
Andrianova et al, 2008).  It is very comforting because the silent implication of the view 
that Chinese economic growth had nothing to do with China’s banks suggests that 
Chinese economic growth could have been even higher had the banking system been more 
supportive.  This is certainly an implication that is not only hard to swallow, given the 
very high growth rates already achieved, but also a disturbing one for the world economy: 
could it have coped with even higher growth rates in China?  
Our empirical findings, robust as they may be, raise an important question that warrants 
further investigation: what is the mechanism that helps to ensure that a state-dominated 
banking system chooses to finance productive privately owned firms?  We believe the 
answer to this question may be found by examining the role of regional governments in 
Chinese economic growth and the links of these governments with regional banks.  There 
is already an important literature which emphasises the contributing role played by 
China’s regional decentralization to the success of Chinese economic reforms and thus to 
Chinese economic growth (e.g. Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000; Li and 
Zhou, 2006; Qian, Roland and Xu, 2006).  What remains to be explored in future research 
are the precise linkages between regional governments and regional banks and their 
implications for the lending behaviour of banks.    
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Appendix 1: Dataset structure 
 
Table A1: By year 
year Freq. Percent 
1999 116,902 10.01 
2000 125,210 10.72 
2001 140,985 12.07 
2002 152,419 13.05 
2003 169,447 14.51 
2004 236,413 20.24 
2005 226,400 19.39 
Total 1,167,776 100 
 
Table A2: By 2-digit SIC industrial classification 
2-digit sic industry Freq. Percent 
13-Food Processing            67,842  5.81 
14-Food Production            28,768  2.46 
15-Beverage Industry            20,079  1.72 
16-Tabacco Industry              1,594  0.14 
17-Textile Industry          101,583  8.7 
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products            58,700  5.03 
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products            28,373  2.43 
20-Timber Processing            22,860  1.96 
21-Furniture Manufacturing            13,179  1.13 
22-Papermaking and Paper Products            36,546  3.13 
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction            26,656  2.28 
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods            15,263  1.31 
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking              8,474  0.73 
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
           85,816  7.35 
27-Medical products            24,727  2.12 
28-Chemical Fibre              5,955  0.51 
29-Rubber Products            13,967  1.2 
30-Plastic Products            54,445  4.66 
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products          104,809  8.98 
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals            27,375  2.34 
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous 
Metals 
           20,910  1.79 
34-Metal Products            63,332  5.42 
35-Ordinary Machinery            86,415  7.4 
36-Special Purposes Equipment            48,087  4.12 
37-Transport Equipment            53,764  4.6 
39-Other Electronic Equipment             69,192  5.93 
40-Electrical Equipment and Machinery            36,201  3.1 
41-Electronic and communication appliances            16,382  1.4 
42-Meters and office appliances            26,482  2.27 
Total       1,167,776  100 
 
 
Table A3: By province 
Region Freq. Percent 
11- Beijing 28,562 2.45 
12- Tianjing 26,610 2.28 
13- Hebei  45,695 3.91 
14- Shanxi 14,772 1.26 
15- Neimenggu 6,700 0.57 
21- Liaonign 39,445 3.38 
22- Jilin 9,594 0.82 
23- 
Heilongjiang 
13,478 
1.15 
31- Shanghai 71,099 6.09 
32- Jiangshu 161,446 13.83 
33- Zhejiang 165,630 14.18 
34- Anhui 24,126 2.07 
35- Fujian 46,308 3.97 
36- Jiangxi 17,999 1.54 
37- Shandong 103,964 8.90 
41- Henan 55,475 4.75 
42- Hubei 36,434 3.12 
43- Hunan 31,366 2.69 
44- Guangdong 155,574 13.32 
45- Guangxi  15,517 1.33 
46- Hainan 2,395 0.21 
50- Chongqin 12,380 1.06 
51- Sichuan 29,926 2.56 
52- Guizhou 9,186 0.79 
53- Yunnan 9,382 0.80 
54- Xizang 1,023 0.09 
61- Shaanxi 12,404 1.06 
62- Ganshu 11,373 0.97 
63- Qinghai 1,558 0.13 
64- Ningxia 2,409 0.21 
65- Xinjiang 5,946 0.51 
Total 1,167,776 100.00 
 
Table A4: By ownership defined according to capital structure 
Ownership Freq. Percent 
State-owned enterprises (SOE) 141,123 12.08 
Collective enterprises (COE) 146,147 12.51 
Private enterprises: 725,293 62.11 
           -Domestic private enterprises (Private_state) 28,463 2.44 
           -Pure Private (PPrviate) 632,607 54.17 
           -Private with foreign capital (Private_for) 64,223 5.50 
Foreign invested enterprises  (FOR) 155,213 13.29 
Total 1,167,776 100.00 
 
 
 
Appendix 2:  TFP estimation method 
 
The total factor productivity (TFP) measure is estimated following the methodology of 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The advantage of this method lies in controlling for the 
simultaneity between firm’s choice of input levels and unobserved productivity shocks by 
using firm’s intermediate inputs (such as raw materials or electricity) as proxies.  
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i at time t is: 
ititittitl mkl εφβ ++≡ ),(
itititkitlit kly εωβββ ++++= 0                  
where y is log of value added, which is sales net intermediate inputs (m), l is labour input 
and k is capital input, and  ),(),( 0 ititititkitittt mkkk ωββωφφ ++=≡
t
 is an unknown function 
of capital and intermediate inputs. φ is strictly increasing in the productivity shock , so 
that it can be inverted and one can write 
itω
),( itittit kmωω =  for some function tω . Levinshon 
and Petrin (2003) approximate ),( ititt mkφ  by a third order polynomial in k and m, 
 and obtain and estimate of sit
j s
j
itjs mk∑∑
0
3 δ
=
3
lβ  and tφ  (up to the intercept) via OLS. This 
constitutes the first stage of the estimation procedure. At the second stage the elasticity of 
capital kβ  is defined as the solution to , where ( )− ititk ϖ 2 it*ˆmin* ∑∑ −−
i t
kitlit ly
k
ββ
β
ϖ  is a 
nonparametric approximation [ ]1| −ititE ωω . Since the estimators involve two stages the 
calculations of the covariance matrix of the parameters must allow for the variation due to 
all of the estimators in the two stages. Levinshon and Petrin (2003) note that the derivation 
of the analytical covariance matrix is quite involved, and suggest the bootstrapping 
procedure to estimate standard errors. In this study 200 bootstrap replications are 
performed. Once consistent estimates of the input elasticities are derived, the log of 
productivity can be obtained as .   itkitlitit kly ββω ˆˆˆ −−=
The data of industrial value-added and intermediate input are deflated by ex-factory price 
indices published in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The fixed assets data are 
deflated by fixed asset price indices published in the China Fixed Asset Statistical 
Yearbook and Chinese Statistical Yearbook (1999-2006). The estimation has been 
conducted by 2-digit SIC industry categories. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 All enterprises (1) SOE (2) COE Private (6)Foreign 
Variables      (3)Private with 
state capital 
(4)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(5)Private with 
foreign capital 
  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
TFP level 1.549 2.209 0.970 3.073 1.518 1.957 1.562 1.949 1.631 1.965 1.724 1.825 1.736 2.446 
Growth of TFP (gTFP) 0.085 0.637 0.004 0.737 0.039 0.631 0.051 0.633 0.117 0.600 0.081 0.600 0.098 0.676 
Industrial value-added level (log term) 3.871 1.393 3.463 2.020 3.743 1.192 4.631 1.664 3.791 1.202 4.351 1.344 4.345 1.355 
Growth of industrial value-added (gIVA) 0.124 0.74 -0.001 0.828 0.057 0.691 0.068 0.685 0.165 0.725 0.116 0.687 0.139 0.777 
BANK, log of bank loans 1.004 1.72 1.910 2.187 1.131 1.653 2.010 2.300 0.846 1.552 0.958 1.770 0.576 1.460 
Equity, log of equity finance 3.596    1.596 3.603 1.916 3.155 1.338 4.902 1.784 3.243 1.394 4.260 1.397 4.646 1.447 
Size (log of total employment) 4.907 1.124 5.043 1.492 4.775 1.022 5.490 1.273 4.618 1.004 5.101 1.074 5.126 1.113 
Age 10.299 11.065 21.929 17.014 13.499 11.304 13.842 13.565 7.827 8.596 7.960 5.934 7.107 3.996 
Exit rate at 3-digit SIC industry level 0.176 0.054 0.247 0.235 0.244 0.235 0.260 0.258 0.385 0.359 0.322 0.321 0.356 0.349 
PRIVY, financial development indicator, 
regional aggregate bank loans to private 
sector over regional GDP in 1999. 
0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 
Percentage of observations (%) 100 - 12.08 12.51 2.44 54.17 5.50 13.29 
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Table 2: Access to bank loans and firm TFP growth 
 
Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.0108*** 0.00944*** 0.00852*** 0.00654** 0.0100*** 0.0139*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.00048) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.00092) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0391*** 0.0367*** 0.0174*** 0.0483*** 0.0407*** 0.0311*** 0.0561*** 
 (0.00080) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0057) (0.0012) (0.0042) (0.0028) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0226*** 0.0445*** -0.0658*** -0.0113 -0.0227*** -0.0206 -0.0923*** 
 (0.0071) (0.017) (0.016) (0.034) (0.0085) (0.027) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.0494 -0.349** 0.200 -0.122 0.0268 0.0576 0.678*** 
 (0.067) (0.15) (0.16) (0.30) (0.089) (0.24) (0.15) 
Age 0.0959*** 0.0634** 0.166*** 0.0675 0.132*** -0.00277 -0.163*** 
 (0.012) (0.032) (0.020) (0.050) (0.012) (0.036) (0.054) 
Age2 -0.714*** -0.411 -1.538*** 0.305 -1.255*** 2.094*** 4.469*** 
 (0.17) (0.57) (0.39) (0.95) (0.22) (0.73) (1.12) 
Initial TFP level -0.136*** -0.123*** -0.153*** -0.122*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0091) (0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0069) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.0862***       
 (0.0044)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0694***       
 (0.0078)       
Pure domestic 
private 
0.107***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0872***       
 (0.0053)       
Foreign 0.0801***       
 (0.0052)       
Constant 0.0172 -0.203*** 0.0230 -0.160 0.0329 -0.0825 0.666*** 
 (0.052) (0.059) (0.073) (0.13) (0.054) (0.099) (0.21) 
Observations 436564 54240 60253 12671 217561 28848 62991 
R2 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.11 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
4743.37; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1291.36; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1723.13; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
352.31; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
2861.16; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1456.83; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
874.49; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: Access to bank loans, TFP growth and regional financial 
development 
 
Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00410*** 0.00541*** 0.00118 0.00188 0.00331*** 0.00674*** 0.00735*** 
 (0.00063) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.00088) (0.0024) (0.0021) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999 
 
1.160*** 
 
0.649** 
 
1.475*** 
 
0.682* 
 
1.149*** 
 
1.153*** 
 
1.328*** 
 (0.049) (0.29) (0.24) (0.38) (0.072) (0.17) (0.22) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0389*** 0.0359*** 0.0179*** 0.0489*** 0.0399*** 0.0301*** 0.0556*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0025) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0305*** 0.0361** -0.0758*** -0.0213 -0.0259*** -0.0226 -0.0918*** 
 (0.0062) (0.014) (0.016) (0.031) (0.0078) (0.024) (0.017) 
(Initial size)2 0.110* -0.292** 0.283* -0.0447 0.0532 0.0714 0.670*** 
 (0.062) (0.13) (0.17) (0.28) (0.079) (0.22) (0.19) 
Age 0.102*** 0.0712*** 0.170*** 0.0772* 0.131*** -0.000977 -0.161*** 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.019) (0.045) (0.013) (0.034) (0.044) 
Age2 -0.812*** -0.554 -1.574*** 0.159 -1.222*** 2.093*** 4.449*** 
 (0.17) (0.46) (0.38) (0.85) (0.23) (0.73) (0.92) 
Initial TFP level -0.136*** -0.124*** -0.156*** -0.122*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.148*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.010) (0.0028) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
Ownership 
dummy 
       
COE 0.0843***       
 (0.0048)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0691***       
 (0.0073)       
Pure private 0.105***       
 (0.0040)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0877***       
 (0.0050)       
Foreign 0.0820***       
 (0.0051)       
Constant -0.0699 -0.228*** -0.0461 -0.189 0.0424 -0.0772 0.660*** 
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.056) (0.13) (0.062) (0.099) (0.21) 
Observations 436564 54240 60253 12671 217561 28848 62991 
R2 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.11 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
5248.72; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1328.54; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1934.19; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
652.37; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
3001.90; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1625.07; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
974.36; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: Access to bank loans and firm IVA growth 
 
Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.0133*** 0.00795*** 0.0114*** 0.00318 0.0134*** 0.0171*** 0.0175*** 
 (0.00047) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.00079) (0.0020) (0.0018) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0662*** 0.0471*** 0.0257*** 0.0638*** 0.0736*** 0.0642*** 0.0822*** 
 (0.00085) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0027) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0287*** 0.0522*** -0.130*** -0.0311 -0.0271*** -0.0442** -0.0894*** 
 (0.0053) (0.014) (0.016) (0.035) (0.0085) (0.021) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.605*** -0.236* 0.957*** 0.144 0.815*** 0.730*** 1.141*** 
 (0.056) (0.14) (0.17) (0.31) (0.091) (0.20) (0.14) 
Age -0.0425*** -0.0335 0.108*** -0.0190 -0.0107 -0.205*** -0.677*** 
 (0.0087) (0.029) (0.021) (0.043) (0.012) (0.040) (0.049) 
Age2 1.806*** 1.193** -0.385 1.913** 1.570*** 6.015*** 16.11*** 
 (0.13) (0.52) (0.40) (0.79) (0.20) (0.87) (1.05) 
Initial IVA level -0.241*** -0.148*** -0.193*** -0.143*** -0.302*** -0.234*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.010) (0.0028) (0.0056) (0.0049) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.146***       
 (0.0044)       
Private with state 
capital 
 
0.127*** 
      
 (0.0052)       
 
Pure private 
 
0.168*** 
      
 (0.0039)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
 
0.166*** 
      
 (0.0054)       
Foreign 0.148***       
 (0.0041)       
Constant -0.580*** -0.755*** -0.545*** -0.680*** -0.397*** -0.483*** 0.498** 
 (0.039) (0.072) (0.065) (0.13) (0.060) (0.099) (0.20) 
Observations 640657 68159 79481 15920 350854 38635 87608 
R2 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.15 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2523.29; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
929.88; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
398.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1289.48; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
869.23; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1373.27; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1307.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Access to bank loans, IVA growth and regional financial 
development 
 
Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00262*** 0.00302 0.00339 -0.00226 0.00144 0.00586*** 0.00559*** 
 (0.00062) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.00099) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999 
1.985*** 0.998*** 1.733*** 1.004*** 2.141*** 1.813*** 2.319*** 
 (0.049) (0.23) (0.27) (0.31) (0.081) (0.17) (0.27) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0650*** 0.0469*** 0.0250*** 0.0635*** 0.0721*** 0.0626*** 0.0812*** 
 (0.00079) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0060) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0027) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0316*** 0.0496*** -0.132*** -0.0330 -0.0304*** -0.0461** -0.0883*** 
 (0.0054) (0.016) (0.017) (0.037) (0.0088) (0.021) (0.013) 
(Initial size)2 0.628*** -0.220 0.968*** 0.156 0.840*** 0.740*** 1.124*** 
 (0.059) (0.14) (0.17) (0.31) (0.099) (0.20) (0.17) 
Age -0.0407*** -0.0326 0.110*** -0.0180 -0.0103 -0.203*** -0.671*** 
 (0.0099) (0.027) (0.020) (0.050) (0.012) (0.031) (0.044) 
Age2 1.801*** 1.186** -0.414 1.911** 1.607*** 6.044*** 16.04*** 
 (0.14) (0.49) (0.37) (0.91) (0.21) (0.67) (0.84) 
Initial IVA level -0.242*** -0.148*** -0.193*** -0.144*** -0.303*** -0.236*** -0.242*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0039) (0.0084) (0.0023) (0.0065) (0.0048) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.147***       
 (0.0037)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.126***       
 (0.0057)       
Pure private 0.169***       
 (0.0034)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.167***       
 (0.0038)       
Foreign 0.151***       
 (0.0043)       
Constant -0.583*** -0.755*** -0.550*** -0.680*** -0.396*** -0.486*** 0.479** 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.053) (0.12) (0.055) (0.076) (0.21) 
Observations 640657 68159 79481 15920 350854 38635 87608 
R2 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2809.11; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1026.03; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
708.23; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1387.58; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1024.51; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1409.21; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1327.78; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
        
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 6: Access to bank loans, TFP growth and regional financial 
development among profit-making firms  
 
Dependent 
variable: TFP 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
domestic 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00449*** 0.00427* 0.00211 0.00367 0.00373*** 0.00802*** 0.00926*** 
 (0.00071) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0017) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999 
 
1.108*** 
 
0.601** 
 
1.403*** 
 
0.578 
 
1.103*** 
 
1.171*** 
 
1.054*** 
 (0.062) (0.27) (0.24) (0.38) (0.074) (0.15) (0.27) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0368*** 0.0270*** 0.0179*** 0.0444*** 0.0394*** 0.0279*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0024) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0231*** 0.0460** -0.0837*** -0.00772 -0.0154 -0.00701 -0.0719*** 
 (0.0064) (0.020) (0.019) (0.041) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016) 
(Initial size)2 0.0663 -0.339* 0.385** -0.123 -0.00116 -0.0598 0.487** 
 (0.069) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) 
Age 0.0796*** 0.0850*** 0.136*** 0.0676 0.109*** -0.0163 -0.156*** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.026) (0.048) (0.014) (0.040) (0.058) 
Age2 -0.298* -0.621 -0.683 0.452 -0.811*** 2.570*** 4.287*** 
 (0.18) (0.56) (0.52) (0.92) (0.24) (0.82) (1.56) 
Initial TFP level -0.129*** -0.112*** -0.157*** -0.118*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0099) (0.0029) (0.0060) (0.0069) 
Ownership 
dummy 
       
COE 0.0772***       
 (0.0049)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.0615***       
 (0.0077)       
Pure private 0.0980***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.0776***       
 (0.0047)       
Foreign 0.0657***       
 (0.0055)       
Constant -0.0495 -0.318*** 0.0186 -0.219 0.0693 -0.135 0.515** 
 (0.053) (0.064) (0.071) (0.16) (0.074) (0.094) (0.22) 
Observations 342657 30912 47618 9346 182016 23720 49045 
R2 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.13 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
4319.02; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1244.06; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) 
=1703.28; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
873.09; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
2720.18; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1332.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
764.31; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Access to bank loans, IVA growth and regional financial 
development among profit-making firms 
 
Dependent 
variable: IVA 
growth 
(1) overall (2) SOE (3) COE Private (7)Foreign 
   (4)Private 
with state 
capital 
(5)Pure 
private 
(6)Private 
with foreign 
capital 
 
Finance variable        
BANK loans(t-1) 0.00420*** 0.00363 0.00552** 0.00169 0.00334*** 0.00669*** 0.00781*** 
 (0.00065) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0041) (0.00098) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Ln(BANK)(t-1)* 
PRIVY1999 
1.879*** 0.806** 1.617*** 0.852* 2.032*** 1.785*** 1.955*** 
 (0.064) (0.32) (0.21) (0.44) (0.083) (0.16) (0.26) 
Equity finance(t-1) 0.0639*** 0.0466*** 0.0245*** 0.0565*** 0.0709*** 0.0574*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.00084) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0064) (0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0025) 
Control        
Initial size -0.0256*** 0.0795*** -0.122*** -0.0143 -0.0293*** -0.0247 -0.0664*** 
 (0.0059) (0.021) (0.018) (0.042) (0.0073) (0.020) (0.016) 
(Initial size)2 0.623*** -0.367* 0.911*** 0.0291 0.891*** 0.538*** 0.874*** 
 (0.065) (0.19) (0.18) (0.36) (0.081) (0.20) (0.17) 
Age -0.0421*** 0.0177 0.0834*** -0.00635 -0.0191* -0.182*** -0.606*** 
 (0.0094) (0.030) (0.019) (0.054) (0.011) (0.037) (0.049) 
Age2 2.088*** 0.414 0.388 1.919* 1.916*** 5.866*** 14.66*** 
 (0.15) (0.53) (0.38) (0.98) (0.21) (0.78) (1.10) 
Initial IVA level -0.241*** -0.152*** -0.192*** -0.138*** -0.297*** -0.218*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.011) (0.0028) (0.0070) (0.0065) 
Ownership dummy        
COE 0.127***       
 (0.0045)       
Private with state 
capital 
0.112***       
 (0.0064)       
Pure domestic 
private 
0.150***       
 (0.0042)       
Private with 
foreign capital 
0.145***       
 (0.0052)       
Foreign 0.124***       
 (0.0048)       
Constant -0.545*** -0.856*** -0.552*** -0.754*** -0.350*** -0.561*** 0.355 
 (0.047) (0.084) (0.063) (0.15) (0.058) (0.089) (0.23) 
Observations 502321 38599 62636 11615 291850 31222 66399 
R2 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.15 
Selection bias 
correction 
chi2(5) = 
2612.83; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
996.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
928.63; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1239.27; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
954.17; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1738.15; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
chi2(5) = 
1184.28; 
Prob>chi2 
=0.0000 
Note 1: The estimator adopted is the selection and endogeneity correction method by Wooldridge (1995). The 
procedure is to estimate a two-stage model, in which the first stage estimates a sample selection model of firm survival 
to obtain a yearly selection mechanism, and the second stage includes the estimated selection mechanism to correct for 
unobserved simultaneneity. The reported joint significance of yearly selection mechanism variables validates the 
adoption of the method.  
Note 2: All estimations include a full set of regional, industrial and year dummy variables. Interaction of yearly 
dummies and regional dummies are also included to capture time-variant regional policy differences. 
Note 3: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
